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Governance by Other Means: Rankings as Regulatory Systems

Judith G. Kelley
Sanford School of Public Policy,
Duke University, Durham, NC, U.S.A.

And

Beth A. Simmons
Department of Political Science and Carey School of Law,
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, U.S.A

Abstract: This article takes the challenges of global governance and legitimacy seriously and
looks at new ways in which international organizations (IOs) have attempted to ‘govern’
without explicit legal or regulatory directives. Specifically, we explore the growth of global
performance indicators as a growing form of social control that appears to have certain
advantages even as states and civil society actors push back against various forms of
international regulatory authority. This article discusses the ways in which Zürn’s diagnosis of
governance dilemmas helps to explain the rise of such ranking systems. These play into
favored paradigms that give information and market performance greater social acceptance
than rules, laws, and directives designed by international organizations. We discuss how and
why these schemes can constitute governance systems, and some of the evidence regarding
their effects on actors’ behaviors. Zürn’s book provides a useful context for understanding the
rise and effectiveness of Governance by Other Means: systems that ‘inform’ and provoke
competition, shaping outcomes without directly legislating performance.
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Global governance has never seemed more necessary, and yet so under attack.
Economies around the world are more dependent than ever on decisions made beyond their
borders. International human rights norms have suffered attacks from multiple directions. The
very habitability of the planet will be influenced by emissions guidelines that need collective
effort and management.
At the same time, evidence of opposition to distant sources of external, international
and ‘global’ authority is abundant. The United States is a prime example of a major
democracy who once took a leadership role in international trade institutions but now
challenges both multilateralism and rule-oriented dispute settlement. Critiques that
international institutions from the International Criminal Court to the International Monetary
Fund, are imperialist have become increasingly resonant in much of the world. International
institutions have been crucial in managing and deepening the processes of interdependence
and accountability in the age of globalization. But the very relevance of global problems has
made collective action both important and controversial. As Zürn points out in his book, A
Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy and Contestation, legitimacy is crucial,
but it is far from guaranteed. 1
Challenges to the legitimacy of international organizations come from rising powers
who seek greater voice and different goals from those instantiated in the Liberal World Order,
as well as from developing countries who resent accepting rules made by imperialist powers.
Legitimacy challenges also come from within the liberal core, where populist opposition to
internationalism has impacted politics and policies. Western disarray in NATO, the refusal of
the US to support multilateralism, and growing civil society skepticism have all contributed to
the legitimacy crisis of international institutions.
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International organizations (IOs) have been struggling to respond to these challenges
to their authority. Zürn’s work points to several such efforts. Some IOs have embraced
transparency, opened their decision-making to scrutiny, and invited broader participation.
Such moves aim to strengthen a consensus among societal actors to support international
institutional deepening. But traditional narratives inviting participation and touting
transparency are not the most creative moves of modern IOs. Today, many are packaging and
deploying information in new ways to achieve their traditional ends.
The dilemmas of modern global governance have made use of what we call global
performance indicators (GPIs) increasingly attractive. Global performance indicators are
defined as a named collection of rank-ordered data that purports to represent the past or
projected performance of different units. 2 IOs have long produced data, but in the recent past
they have promulgated overtly strategic state rating and ranking systems that package and
deploy information intentionally to advocate policy and to influence its implementation.
Rather than double down on top down regulatory commands, IOs have engaged in this form
of information politics that governs through comparison. Here is the basic pattern: the
organization creates a quantifiable (or quasi-quantifiable) index that compares the
performance of multiple states within a region or more broadly; they make the index publicly
and easily available, and publish it on a regular predictable schedule. The measures are
typically explicitly normative, policy focused, and are deployed to influence state-level
outcomes. GPIs can take several forms, the most influential of which use numbers or grades
to rate or rank state performance, compressing enormous variance into a simplified scale. 3
Ordinal categories are often used to produce (un)flattering peer group comparisons as well.
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Zürn’s book analyzes the context in which the turn to information politics of this kind
makes sense for authoritative IOs facing challenges to their legitimacy. We build on his
analysis by pointing to GPIs as a technology for threading the needle of the governance
dilemma. The most clever organizations increasingly try to govern using information politics
rather than old-style command and control. Zürn show that IOs try to justify their hierarchical
authority through various technocratic and participatory narratives; we add that they also shift
to information politics that avoid the appearance of a directive, and are therefore more likely
fly beneath the radar of public contestation. We explain why assessing and ranking states’
performance is potentially impactful and provide an example from a beleaguered international
financial institution, the World Bank. GPIs do not eliminate the contestation of authority, but
they do help to camouflage that authority among the everyday pressures of politics, the media
and the market.

The rise of indicators: an informational response to a governing dilemma
When IOs face challenges to their authority, they have incentives to develop tools that
garner less resistance. GPIs are one such tool. According to a recent study, GPI growth has
been nearly exponential. Approximately 20 GPIs in use in the late 1990s; by the next decade,
the number had roughly quadrupled, and in the next 15 years it more than tripled. 4 This
proliferation responded to growing demands for policy-relevant performance data, facilitated
by the fact that information was becoming ever easier to collect, process and disseminate. 5
Zürn’s analysis suggests global performance assessments may have intensified because of the
heightened politicization of the issues and institutions of global governance.
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Why use indicators? IOs are attracted to them for a number of reasons. First, their
deployment is a nearly imperceptible shift in the repertoire of traditional IO functions. IOs
have collected, curated, and circulated data for decades. Information provision was one of the
functions Robert Keohane cited in his seminal work explaining why international institutions
exist in the first place. 6 One reason weak international institutions can enhance domestic
accountability is by providing compliance data. 7 From the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators to the UN’s Commodity Trade Statistics Database to the Food and Agricultural
Organization’s Forestry Database, collecting and organizing data has long been a core
competency of IOs. Governance by assessment and ranking, that is, by GPIs, was a subtle
process that could be considered an outgrowth of a long-accepted IO function. Soon it would
seem natural that the World Bank would rank every country in the world from top to bottom
on an Ease of Doing Business (EDB) Index, 8 and that the United Nations would do the same
with respect to a Gender Inequality Index. 9 After all, what could be more legitimate than IOs
producing information?
GPIs are not simply data in the neutral sense; they are deployed to set standards,
establish policy agendas, and ultimately to influence legislation, regulations, behavior, and
outcomes. Their labels are explicitly and increasingly normative. Their presentation invites
audiences to ask, ‘how’s my state doing?’ often inviting audiences browsing online
interactively to shuffle various sub-indicators to view how one’s state (and its competitors)
perform according to various criteria. Comparisons are utterly integral to such exercises: the
OECD’s ‘Better Life Index’ invites viewers to ‘compare well-being across countries, based on
11 topics the OECD has identified as essential, in the areas of material living conditions and

Keohane 1982.
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quality of life.’ 10 About two-thirds of active GPIs employ explicit top-to-bottom ranking
systems, and over a third create clear normative categories or performance tiers, usually in
addition to a ranking or rating. 11 These features render GPIs a potent tool for producing social
control through the pressure of comparative information.
Experience suggests comparative indicators are a tried and true tool of influence. IOs
can look to an impressive history of effective ranking systems used by private actors. Bond
rating agencies are a notoriously powerful example. 12 But so are everyday raters such as US
News and World Reports on colleges and universities, 13 and Consumer Reports on everything
from toasters to automobiles. 14 In short, there are plenty of good examples that are highly
effective in nudging households, investors and even states toward touted outcomes.
Perhaps the major reason IOs found rankings a convenient technology of governance
is because GPIs address what Zürn suggests could be at the core of their legitimacy crisis:
trying to be effective without being overly directive. Ranking systems do no not work in quite
the same top-down way as rules, laws, and directives, at least not to the naked eye. They are
harnesses rather than commands. GPIs represent standards desired by the rater, and if the rater
is salient and respected enough, social dynamics of competition, reputational concerns, and
status obsessions take over.
Most attractive of all, the deployment of GPIs preserves, even enhances, perceptions
of an IO’s competence without raising legitimacy red flags. GPIs leverage expertise without
issuing commands, and if they work as hoped, they burnish perceptions of competence on an
issue without generating offense at external officiousness. They can deflect the criticisms
about such pressure to third parties, such as investors or aid donors, who are at liberty to use

OECD, http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/.
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the ranking to guide their resource decisions. 15 For these reasons, GPIs have proved an
attractive technology of governance for IOs facing the legitimacy dilemma. They change the
dynamics of ‘rules’ and ‘ruling.’ In short, GPIs are a handy technology to supplement and
sometimes replace compliance politics with information politics.

Indicators as technologies of governance: why they work
But do GPIs really ‘work’ as effective technologies of governance? New research is
emerging to answer this question, and, while it is limited to a few policy domains, we can
advance some general if tentative responses. 16
Why should governments care about a simple ranking or rating? GPIs work through
social pressure, which is applied by making peer comparisons. All social pressure operates
through a change in the informational environment, targeting an entity’s reputation or status.
Sometimes officials (or bureaucrats, or citizens) care about reputation and status as an end in
itself, 17 and sometimes they may be concerned about material consequences (foreign
assistance, investment). When they know their state is being ranked, and that their
performance will be splashed across the internet, they experience social pressure to conform
to the criteria established by the rater. In anticipation of regularized rounds of rankings, they
may even internalize the values of the rater, and eventually self-regulate. As Deitelhoff and
Daase suggest, whether this form of pressure is ‘good’ or ‘benevolent’ is – to say the least –
debatable. Our point here is that it can have very real effects on the targeted state through a
status mechanism. 18

See the policy evaluation criteria for the Millennium Development Corporation at:
https://www.mcc.gov/resources/doc/report-selection-criteria-methodology-fy18.
16
Bisbee et al. 2019; Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons 2019; Honig and Weaver 2019; Kelley 2017; Kelley
and Simmons 2015; Morse 2019.
17
Adler-Nissen 2014; Chwieroth 2013; Nelson 2017.
18
Deitelhoff and Daase 2020.
15

7

GPI creators including IOs seek to engage this concern with status and reputation by
leveraging comparative information among peers. 19 Explicit comparisons create contexts in
which judgments are formed and identities are established and reinforced. 20 They foster
‘commensuration,’ or ‘the comparison of different entities according to a common metric,’ as
a way of making highly-simplified sense of the world. 21 Moreover, the media is particularly
fond of reporting relative rankings; in numerous interviews GPI creators frankly acknowledge
that they created such indexes precisely to attract media attention. 22
One source of GPI power is the credibility and authority of its creator. What makes
some GPI creators more authoritative than others? The social psychology literature suggests
that one source of legitimate authority is trust, which, in turn, develops out of a perception
that an actor is fair, knowledgeable, and/or competent. 23 GPI creators also gain authority
based on their assumed competence and expertise. 24 Network centrality may matter as well.
Actors centrally located in a social and political network are better able to set agendas 25 and
impact information flows, 26 which facilitates data collection and GPI dissemination. 27 It
would be naïve to assert, of course, that leverage over resources plays no role. Direct control
over resources and indirect influence over third parties that control resources are important
reasons states pay attention to ratings and rankings as well, as Vincent Pouliot notes. 28 For
these reasons – epistemic and quasi-coercive – major IOs are well-positioned to influence

In one exceptionally ambitious effort to exercise social control through ranking, China reportedly has
pilot programs to rate each and every citizen according to a form of “social credit.” See reports at
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agendas, set status competition in motion, and judge performance better than just about any
other corporate body.
The genius of ‘governing’ through GPIs is that IOs can set the criteria for
performance, and then tap some very strong competitive dynamics. GPI information
reverberates in domestic politics, especially when amplified by the popular or social media. 29
Iterative assessment and ranking exercises incentivize government bureaucrats to take IOs’
expert advice directly into account in their policymaking. 30 GPIs activate transnational
pressures and influence how third parties such as foreign investors, donors or other states
respond to – or are anticipated to respond to – the ratings. 31 Such systems appear to operate
nearly hands-free, by enabling improved domestic accountability and what might be thought
of as market discipline. This is a highly attractive governing technology for IOs whose
legitimacy is palpably on the wane.

Example: The World Bank and the Ease of Doing Business index
The World Bank is a telling case study. As Zürn points out, politicization surrounding
the Bank’s policies intensified over the course of the 1990s, culminating in the Battle in
Seattle. The Bank had long tapped its expertise to justify loan conditionality, using a
technocratic narrative – ‘we know development’ – to try and coerce better governance from
its clients. For whatever reasons – including growing skepticism of interference of
international financial institutions in traditional areas of state sovereignty 32 – tools of
economic leverage were seen as undesirable and/or ineffective ways to encourage such
change. Instead the Bank intentionally chose a communication device that leverages the views
Carpenter 2007; McCombs and Shaw 1972.
Masaki and Parks 2020.
31
Bisbee et al. 2019; Morse 2019.
32
Zürn 2018.
29
30
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of other actors to stoke pressure for regulatory change, even while distancing themselves
from the possibility of policy failures. Rankings served that purpose: unlike strict forms of
conditionality, they nudge performance in the international financial institutions’ favored
direction without directly accepting responsibility for negative outcomes. 33
Publication of the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) index was not without controversy.
Praised by western businesses, it met with skepticism by another major IO, the International
Labor Organization, 34 and at least one major state, China. 35 The EDB includes such subindicators as a count of days it takes to start a business, days for a contract to be enforced in
the courts, how many procedures are required to get a business license, and the ease of
winding up a bankruptcy. On these and a few other criteria, the Bank ranks states from top to
bottom. 36
Over the past decade, policy makers around the world have spoken and acted as
though the EDB matters greatly. 37 Countries openly publicize their plans to undertake
reforms. Georgia – whom some have criticized for gaming the system – announced concerted
efforts to rise from 100th to the top 20 in two years. 38 National officials in Yemen, 39
Portugal, 40 Mauritius, 41 El Salvador, 42 and India have also highlighted EDB as motivating
reforms. Some of these same countries have at varying times been among the most vociferous
critics of international financial institutions. As time went on, researchers started to take these

Best 2014.
See the critique of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), at
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/gurn/00171.pdf.
35
In 2013 a formal review (Independent Doing Business Report Review Panel, 24 June 2013,
Washington D.C.) commenced following pressure from China which was unhappy with its rankings, discussed
tensions over the rankings and once again recommended that they be removed. The Bank ignored the
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36
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37
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38
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indicators as data – ground-level truth about the business environment 43 – eliding further the
distinction between ‘truth’ and social pressure function that originally gave rise to their
promulgation. As states began to jockey to ascend the rankings by implementing very specific
EDB-consistent reforms, 44 it became increasingly apparent that the Bank had successfully
harnessed competitive dynamics to secure its policy preferences.
New experimental evidence suggests that rankings as a strategic way of presenting
performance information are impactful. Controlling for other kinds of economic information,
relative EDB rankings influence investors’ assessments of where it is desirable to make
investments. Similarly public attitudes on reform priorities have been shown to respond to
information about poor EDB rankings vis-à-vis a salient competitor. 45 As the Bank itself has
noted, ‘The main advantage of showing a single rank: it is easily understood by politicians,
journalists, and development experts and therefore created pressure to reform. As in sports,
once you start keeping score everyone wants to win.’ 46 Conservative think tanks concur that
there is something highly motivating about rankings: CATO’s Director speculates that
‘Stripping the ordinal rankings and “reforming” the report’s methodology would have the
effect of completely destroying the report’s credibility and usefulness as a policy tool.’ 47 As if
on cue, one informant in the investment consulting industry exclaimed (anonymously) that the
EDB Index was one of the most effective things the World Bank had ever done. 48
The World Bank is far from the only IO to address the dilemma of governance facing
a legitimacy deficit with the implicit governance of GPIs. This strategy is pervasive and

Corcoran and Gillanders 2015.
Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons 2019.
45
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growing. The European Institute uses the ‘European Gender Equality Index’ to incentivize
attention to employment gaps by gender; 49 the World Intellectual Property Organization is
‘Energizing the World with Innovation’ using its ‘Global Innovation Index,’ 50 and the
International Telecommunications Union has deployed its Global Cyber Security Index to
measure ‘the commitment of Member States to cybersecurity in order to raise awareness.’ 51
Whether and to what extent these assessment regimes affect outcomes is a vibrant area of
current research. Such schemes seem to be a pervasive response to the dilemma of governance
in an age of growing politicization and diminishing IO legitimacy.

Conclusions
Michael Zürn’s Theory of Global Governance: Authority, Legitimacy and
Contestation, is an insightful diagnosis of the dilemmas faced by IOs as they try to deal with
global problems on the one hand and face growing politicization and resistance to their
authority on the other. States and societies have certainly chafed under the delegation of
important aspect of decision making to IOs. Rational institutions, theories of hands-tying and
rational explanations for delegation appear to be blunt analytical tools in the face of recent
revolts against the authority of IOs to govern.
Zürn’s book is intriguing precisely because IOs face growing pressures to govern
creatively. What they do matters, and the more it matters, to the more resistance can be
expected to their extranational exhortations and commands. If international legitimacy is in
question, there are new incentives to expand the repertoire of governing responses. GPIs fit
the bill: they create an impression of voluntary compliance with the exertion of minimal

See the EU Institute at https://eige.europa.eu/gender-equality-index
See the WIPO at http://www.wipo.int/publications/en/details.jsp?id=4330.
51
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49
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external enforcement. Research on the conditions under which GPIs are effective substitutes
for (or complements to) traditional governance approaches helps to address the dilemma that
Michael Zürn has exposed.
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